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INTERNATIONAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES ARBITRAL AWARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES-Signatories to the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States are not entitled
to sovereign immunity with respect to enforcement
of ICSID arbitral awards, Liberian Eastern Timber
Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650 F.
Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
Plaintiff,' a Liberian corporation owned and controlled by French
nationals, procured an arbitral award against defendant, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Liberia (Liberia),2 issued under the rules
of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).3 Plaintiff applied in United States federal district court to
Plaintiff is the Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) and is designated
as the "Putative Arbitration Award Creditor" in the style of the case. Liberian E.
Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). The French owners of LETCO were required to form a Liberian company
in order to carry out investment in Liberia. Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government
of Republic of Liberia, 26 I.L.M. 647, 654 (1987), award rectified, 26 I.L.M. 677
(1987).
2 Defendant is designated as the "Putative Arbitration Award Debtor" in the
style of the case. LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. at 73.
In 1970, Liberia granted LETCO a concession agreement (Agreement) allowing
LETCO to harvest over 400,000 acres of Liberian timber in return for guarantees
by LETCO, inter alia, to employ Liberian nationals and invest a percentage of the
operation's profits in Liberia. Ten years later Liberia prematurely revoked the
concession. LETCO claimed that under the terms of the Agreement Liberia had no
grounds for the revocation, and even if it did, Liberia had not given proper notice
to LETCO as required by the Agreement. In compliance with the arbitration clause
in the Agreement, LETCO submitted its claims for arbitration by a tribunal of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The tribunal
found in favor of LETCO and issued an award for $8,750,286 despite the fact that
Liberia refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings. LETCO v. Liberia, 26
I.L.M. at 677.
1 ICSID was established under Article 1(1) of the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The purpose of ICSID is to provide neutral
arbitration facilities for the settlement of investment disputes between Contracting
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enforce the arbitral award. 4 The court issued an ex parte judgment
enforcing the award5 and plaintiff subsequently obtained a writ of
execution on defendant's assets in the United States.6 Defendant then
States and nationals of other Contracting States. ICSID Convention, 17 U.S.T. at
1273, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 162.
Both Liberia and France are Contracting States to the ICSID Convention. Article
25 of the ICSID Convention provides:
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any con-
stituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When
the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means:
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party
to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting
State for the purposes of this Convention.
ICSID Convention, art. 25, paras. 1-2, 17 U.S.T. at 1280, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 174 (emphasis added).
The arbitrators held, therefore, that Liberia's refusal to participate in the arbitration
was immaterial, because LETCO and Liberia had consented in the written concession
agreement to submit disputes to the Centre before Liberia unilaterally attempted to
withdraw its consent. LETCO v. Liberia, 26 I.L.M. at 652. The tribunal also held
that, based on the complete French control of LETCO and the parties' course of
dealing, they had implicitly agreed to treat LETCO as a French national for purposes
of ICSID arbitration. Id. at 652-54.
4 The United States is also a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention. Article
54(1) of the Convention provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by
that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court
in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce
such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such
courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of
a constituent state. ICSID Convention, 17 U.S.T. at 1291, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194.
Article 69 of the Convention requires each contracting state to pass legislation
enabling the provisions of the Convention to be effective in that contracting state.
ICSID Convention, art. 69, 17 U.S.T. at 1296, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 202. The enabling legislation in the United States is embodied in 22 U.S.C. §§
1650, 1650a (1982).
' An ex parte judgment is one granted on the application, and for the benefit
of, one party only and without notice to the opposing party. BLACK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979).
6 LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. at 75.
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moved to vacate the ex parte judgment in the federal district court,
or, in the alternative, to vacate the execution of that judgment on
its United States property. 7 Defendant argued that United States courts
had jurisdiction neither to enforce, nor issue executions on, the
arbitral award 8 because defendant had not waived its sovereign im-
munity and was therefore immune from suit under Section 1605 of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).9 Held, affirmed in
part. 10 Signatories to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the "Con-
vention") waive their sovereign immunity under the FSIA in United
States federal courts with respect to the enforcement of any arbitral
awards entered pursuant to the Convention. Liberian Eastern Timber
Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), appeal filed, (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 1986).
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The ICSID Convention
The Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (the "World Bank") formulated the Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States primarily to stimulate increased private
Id. at 74.
Liberia also alleged that the executions of the judgment entered by the court
had been improperly served on sovereign assets in the United States. Additionally,
since the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants immunity from execution to
"property ... [not] used for a commercial activity," the executions on the judgment
should be vacated. The district court agreed and vacated the executions. LETCO v.
Liberia, 650 F. Supp. at 78. The question of whether Liberia ship registry fees and
tonnage taxes are immune from execution is currently on appeal in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
9 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). Section 1605(a) provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case -
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the
foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of
the waiver.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1982).
The remainder of the statute enumerates several other exceptions to sovereign
immunity for foreign states, none of which were applied to the enforcement issue
in the LETCO v. Liberia case.
1o See supra note 8.
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international investment in developing countries." Prior to the Con-
vention, the official fora of the state in which the investment occurred
were usually the only fora available to resolve disputes between private
investors and states. 12 The lack of a more neutral forum provided a
disincentive to prospective investors, and both investors and states
that wished to attract investment felt it would be mutually beneficial
to have an international method of dispute settlement available. 3 The
World Bank Directors, therefore, designed the Convention to ensure
that parties to investment agreements could have disputes settled by
knowledgeable and impartial arbitrators whose decisions would pro-
vide effective remedies. 14
To accomplish these goals the Convention established the Inter-
national Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The Centre provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other
Contracting States. 5 Conciliation or arbitration of all investment
disputes by ICSID is not mandatory; the Centre's jurisdiction is based
on the parties' consent to submit a dispute to the Centre. 6 The
Convention states that arbitral awards issued pursuant to the Con-
vention "shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to
1 Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, submitted to
governments Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 525 [hereinafter World Bank Report].
As of January 1, 1987, eighty-eight countries were signatories to the Convention.
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 9433, TREATIES IN
FORCE 267 (1987).
12 World Bank Report, supra note 11, at 525.
13 Id. The State Department's support for ICSID was stated as follows:
As the country with the greatest amount of international investment, and
the greatest stake in the development and wide acceptance of international
law standards regarding protection of private property, the United States
stands to gain substantially from the convention. Moreover, if the convention
facilities do lead, as we expect, to increased investment by Americans and
others in the less developed countries, this will benefit in an important way
our overall objective of international economic development and will com-
plement our foreign assistance programs and related activities.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearings on H.R. 15785
Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dept. of State).
4 World Bank Report, supra note 11, at 525.
1 ICSID Convention, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. at 1273, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 162.
16 ICSID Convention, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. at 1280, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 174.
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any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in [the]
Convention." 7 The exclusive remedies provided for in the Convention
are revision and annulment proceedings which either party may in-
stitute only within the Centre.' Through these limitations the Con-
vention provides for complete and final resolution of all legal and
factual issues in an international, and therefore presumptively neu-
tral, 19 forum.
In addition to providing this neutral forum, the Convention's en-
forcement provisions make it highly likely that the prevailing party
in a dispute resolved through ICSID will be able to collect on the
award. Under Article 54 of the Convention each Contracting State
must recognize and enforce an award rendered pursuant to the Con-
vention upon presentation of a certified copy of the award to a
competent domestic court. 20 This strong enforcement provision is
weakened to some extent because Article 55 defers to the law in each
Contracting State on sovereign immunity from execution. 2' Never-
theless, the prospects for a creditor in possession of an ICSID award
collecting on that award are better than prospects for collecting on
a domestic court judgment. This improvement is due to Article 54,
under which a prevailing party can look not only to assets held in
its own state or the state of the award debtor, but can also obtain
ICSID Convention, art. 53, 17 U.S.T. at 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 194.
11 ICSID Convention, arts. 51, 52, 17 U.S.T. at 1289-91, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 190-92.
'9 See World Bank Report, supra note 11, at 525.
20 ICSID Convention, art. 54, 17 U.S.T. at 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 194. For the text of Article 54(1), see supra note 4. Article 54(2) provides:
A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a Contracting
State shall furnish to a competent court or other authority which shall have
been designated for this purpose a copy of the award certified by the
Secretary-General.
ICSID Convention, art. 54, para. 2, 17 U.S.T. at 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 194.
23 ICSID Convention, arts. 54(3), 55, 17 U.S.T. at 1292, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 194. Article 54(3) provides:
Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the
execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such
execution is sought.
Id.
Article 55 provides:
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in
force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any
foreign State from execution.
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enforcement, and attempt to collect on the award debtor's assets in
any Contracting State. 22
B. The United States' Enabling Legislation
President Johnson ratified the Convention with the advice and
consent of the Senate in 1966 and the United States acceded to the
Convention that same year. 23 In that year, Congress also enacted
enabling legislation required by the Convention, which provides:
An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV
of the Convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the
United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award
shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit
as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general juris-
diction of one of the several states. The Federal Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) shall not apply to enforcement of awards rendered
pursuant to the convention. 24
This statute, which implements Article 54(1) of the Convention,25
gives the federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce the awards by
characterizing the awards as creating a "right arising under a treaty. 2 6
By making the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) inapplicable to en-
forcement of ICSID awards, the statute implicitly recognizes that
United States courts may enforce any ICSID award and that revision
and annulment are not to be handled by United States courts. 27 The
22 Article 54(1) requires each Contracting State to enforce the pecuniary obligations
of any ICSID award. ICSID Convention, art. 54(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194.
23 United States instrument of ratification for ICSID Convention, signed Sept.
30, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1356.
2 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (1982). Congress passed this legislation pursuant to the
requirements of the Convention. See ICSID Convention, art. 69, 17 U.S.T. at 1296,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 202.
25 Hearings, supra note 13, at 4 (testimony of Hon. Fred B. Smith, General
Counsel, Dept. of Treasury).
26 The judicial power of the federal courts extends "to all cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made or which shall be made, under their Authority. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2, cl. 1; accord Hearings, supra note 13, at 5 (testimony of Hon. Fred B. Smith,
General Counsel, Dept. of Treasury).
27 The FAA provides that arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the FAA may
only be enforced in the courts specified by the parties, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982), and
allows the courts to vacate or modify awards on specified grounds, 9 U.S.C. §§
10-11 (1982). In contrast, the ICSID Convention provides that any Contracting State
is obligated to enforce ICSID arbitral awards. ICSID Convention, art. 54, 17 U.S.T.
at 1289-91, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 190-94; accord Hearings, supra note
13 at 4 (testimony of Hon. Fred B. Smith, General Counsel, Dept. of Treasury).
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statute also clearly mandates enforcement of the pecuniary obligations
of ICSID awards, and brings the awards within the full faith and
credit clause of the 14th Amendment, thereby precluding any defenses
to enforcement based on a lack of reciprocity or lack of comity. 2s
The enabling legislation seems, however, to adopt a weaker position
on enforcement than that required by the Convention. The full faith
and credit language or the statute appears to allow domestic courts
to re-evaluate an ICSID tribunal's jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of the dispute, and to evaluate the procedural
aspects of the arbitration. 29 In contrast, the Convention provides that
parties must use the Convention's annulment proceedings when ob-
jecting to the validity of an award on jurisdictional or procedural
grounds.3 0 Additionally, the enabling statute does not explicitly deny
to Contracting States any sovereign immunity from enforcement,
although the mandatory enforcement language in Article 54 of the
Convention implicitly denies sovereign immunity at the enforcement
stage.II
C. The United States Law on Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity exempts a state from the
exercise of the public authority of another state's domestic courts.3 2
28 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (Full faith and credit clause eliminates
issues of reciprocity and comity that would otherwise arise in actions to enforce
foreign judgments.)
29 Coll, United States Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States:
Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 401, 411 (1976).
30 The grounds for annulment of an ICSID arbitral award are 1) the Tribunal
was not properly constituted, 2) the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, 3)
corruption on the part of an arbitrator, 4) a serious departure from a fundamental
rule of procedure, or 5) that the award does not state the reasons on which it is
based. ICSID Convention, art. 52, 17 U.S.T. at 1290-91, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 192. The only ground for revision of an ICSID arbitral award is
discovery of a material fact not known before the award was granted and not
negligently missed by the party requesting revision. ICSID Convention, art. 51, at
1289, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. at 190-92.
1' Article 54 mandates that the arbitral awards be enforced by all Contracting
States upon presentation of a certified copy of the award, and does not mention
sovereign immunity. Article 55 mentions sovereign immunity only in relation to
execution. ICSID Convention, arts. 54, 55, at 1291-92, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. at 194. These articles should be interpreted to be consistent with the object
and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 31, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Such an interpretation leads to the conclusion that the Convention prohibits the
defense of sovereign immunity from enforcement.
32 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
During the early part of the 20th century the Supreme Court of the
United States relied on State Department policies in deciding whether
a foreign state was entitled to sovereign immunity from suit.33 In
1952, the State Department formally adopted the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. 34 Under this theory, a foreign state is immune
from legal actions arising out of its public acts, but is not immune
from actions based on its commercial or private acts. 5 In practice,
however, since a foreign state could exert diplomatic pressure on the
State Department to gain the Department's recommendation of a
grant of immunity, the federal courts could not consistently apply
the restrictive doctrine. 6 This situation gave an unfair advantage to
influential foreign states,3 7 and discouraged private parties from con-
tracting with foreign governments because they could not be certain
that United States courts would deny immunity to foreign governments
with which they had commercial disputes.3" Congress responded to
this situation by codifying the restrictive doctrine in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the "FSIA").3 9
The FSIA sets forth uniform standards for courts to employ when
deciding whether a foreign state is entitled to immunity from suit in
United States federal or state courts. The Act ensures consistent
application of United States sovereign immunity policy by removing
the decision-making process from the political influences in the foreign
relations arena. ° The language of the FSIA and its legislative history
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606; see G.M. BADR, STATE IMMUNrTY: AN
ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 79 (1984).
33 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6606.
34 Id. Before 1952 the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity had been developing
in international practice, but the State Department resisted changing from the theory
of absolute immunity. J. STEVENSON, J. BROWNE & L. DAMROSCH, UNITED STATES
LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
13 (1983). In 1952 the State Department issued the "Tate Letter" which announced
the adjustment in its policy to* conform with the restrictive theory. 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984 (1952).
3 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6607.
36 Id.
37 In fact, many countries' courts directly applied the restrictive theory, and a
foreign state did not have the opportunity to petition a foreign affairs agency or
exert diplomatic pressure to gain immunity from suit. The United States, therefore,
did not receive the same liberal grants of immunity that it afforded to other nations.
J. STEVENSON, J. BROWNE & L. DAMROSCH, supra note 34, at 16; H.R. REP. No.
1487, supra note 32, at 6607.
31 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6607.
39 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
40 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6610; see Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 588-89 (1943).
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also indicate that the Act does not preempt jurisdictional rules already
established in any international agreements in force at the time the
FSIA became effective. 41
The FSIA begins with the proposition that all foreign states are
entitled to immunity and then specifies exceptions to this general
rule. 42 Section 1605(a)(1) provides the exception most often applied
in the situation of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This section
states that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction in any
case "in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in ac-
cordance with the terms of the waiver." 43
The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that Congress intended
the courts to use the waiver exception as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction over foreign states where private litigants seek to enforce
foreign arbitral awards in United States courts.4 The decisions in-
volving the application of the waiver exception in enforcement of
arbitral award cases reveal confusion, however, as to the scope of
any implied waiver which arises out of a foreign state's agreement
to arbitrate.45 The language in the legislative history is unclear, but
4' Section 1604 of the Act reads:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is
a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) (emphasis added).
The House Report on the FSIA states that the FSIA "is intended to preempt any
other State or Federal Law (excluding applicable international agreements) for ac-
cording immunity to foreign sovereigns .... " H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32,
at 6610 (emphasis added).
42 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1982).
43 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
4 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6617. The House Report indicates tacit
approval of this use of the waiver exception with the following language: "With
respect to implicit waivers, the courts have found such waivers in cases where a
foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country .... " Id.
11 See Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
("[It] is unclear whether, in referring to 'another country', Congress intended to
include a third-party country"); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("[Tlhe presense of third-party nation choice
of law and forum clauses does not in any sense [imply] consent to United States
jurisdiction.") ; Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of United Republic of Tanzania,
507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980) ("[Ain agreement to arbitrate, standing alone, is
sufficient to implicitly waive immunity, as was recognized by Congress.") ; Ipitrade
Int'l. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) ("The legislative
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can be read to mean that whenever a foreign state agrees to arbitration
in any country it implicitly waives its sovereign immunity in United
States courts. 46 This expansive notion of implicit waiver has been
highly criticized, most notably for purporting to extend jurisdiction
of federal courts into an area of sensitive foreign relations. 47
A general consensus exists, however, that a foreign state's agreement
to arbitrate in the United States constitutes an implicit waiver of its
sovereign immunity from enforcement of the award in United States
courts. 4 In Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of United Republic of
Tanzania,49 Tanzania agreed to arbitration and to allow for judgment
to be entered on any arbitral award. The parties arbitrated the dispute
in New York, but Tanzania opposed the writ of garnishment the
plaintiff obtained after entry of judgment on the award, alleging that
the FSIA entitled Tanzania to sovereign immunity. The court held
that, under the FSIA, Tanzania's agreement to arbitrate in New York
constituted an implicit waiver of immunity from enforcement of the
arbitral award.50
A foreign state's agreement to arbitrate in a country which is a
signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention") 5 also con-
stitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FSIA for purposes
history of [section 1605] expressly states that an agreement to arbitrate or to submit
to the laws of another country constitutes an implicit waiver.").
46 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 32, at 6617; Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 506
F. Supp. at 986, Ipitrade Int'l, 465 F. Supp. at 824.
41 See Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1281; Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 506 F. Supp.
at 986; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("[lIt is . . . difficult to infer ... a waiver from the agreement of a foreign
state to submit itself ... to the jurisdiction of a state other than the United States."),
aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981) (Agreeing with the court that
"[Such a view] would presage a vast increase in the jurisdiction of federal courts
in matters of sensitive foreign relations. . . . [The parties] could scarely have foreseen
this untoward result when they signed the contract; and it is unlikely that Congress
could have intended it."); rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 461 U.S. 480
(1983). See generally, Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985) (Implicit
waiver clause of § 1605 is narrowly construed.)
41 See Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1284; Birch Shipping Corp., 507 F. Supp. at
312; Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp.
1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 1980).
41 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
10 Id. at 312.
1' Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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of enforcement of the award.5 2 In Ipitrade International v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria,53 Nigeria agreed to arbitrate disputes arising
under its agreement with Ipitrade International (Ipitrade) under Swiss
law and under International Chamber of Commerce rules in Paris,
France. The parties arbitrated a dispute according to the agreement,
but Nigeria opposed Ipitrade's attempt to enforce the award in the
United States, claiming immunity under the FSIA. The court held
that because the award was subject to the New York Convention,
and the United States, France, Switzerland and Nigeria were all
signatories to the Convention, Nigeria waived its sovereign immunity
by agreeing to the arbitration.5 4
The federal courts considered the relationship between the FSIA
and the ICSID Convention only one time prior to LETCO v. Liberia.
In Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea,
MINE convinced a federal district court to compel arbitration before
the American Arbitration Association (the "AAA")." MINE sub-
sequently moved in federal district court to enforce the award it
obtained at the AAA arbitration. Guinea objected, alleging that it
did not waive its sovereign immunity under the FSIA when it agreed
to ICSID arbitration. Guinea argued, therefore, that it was immune
from suit and the judgment compelling arbitration and the resulting
award were nullities. The district court disagreed, reasoning that
because the parties contemplated ICSID arbitration, which the court
assumed normally took place in Washington, D.C., Guinea implicitly
waived its sovereign immunity in United States courts. On appeal,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
52 See Acme v. MCP, No. 85 Civ. 3765 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824
(D.D.C. 1978).
3 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
14 Id. at 826.
11 Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp.
141 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982). MINE, a Liechtenstein
corporation, entered into an agreement with the Republic of Guinea to create a
mixed economy company to provide shipping services to transport Guinean bauxite
to foreign markets. The agreement contained an ICSID arbitration clause, but after
a dispute arose no formal request for ICSID arbitration was ever filed. MINE
petitioned for AAA arbitration under sections 4 and 5 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4,
5 (1982). Those sections empower federal district courts to order arbitration to
proceed according to the arbitration clause in the contract between the parties or
to order arbitration before an arbitrator not named in the contract if a party fails
to avail himself of the agreed upon method of choosing arbitrators. MINE v. Guinea,
693 F.2d at 1094.
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that a state's agreement to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration does
not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity before the enforcement
stage, because ICSID rules do not contemplate a role for United
States courts until after the dispute is settled by ICSID arbitration. 6
ANALYsIs
In Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Liberia,57 Liberia challenged
the jurisdiction of United States courts to enforce ICSID arbitral
awards. Liberia moved to vacate an ex parte judgment of a United
States district court enforcing an ICSID arbitral award, arguing that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment or
issue executions on Liberia's property. Liberia contended that the
FSIA deprived the district court of jurisdiction because Liberia had
not waived its sovereign immunity either by entering into the con-
cession agreement with LETCO, by agreeing to the arbitration, or
by cancelling the agreement. 8 In response, LETCO argued that Lib-
eria's agreement to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration did constitute
an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. The waiver, LETCO con-
tended, could be implied from the fact that Article 54 requires each
Contracting State to enforce ICSID awards and, therefore, Liberia
knew, before agreeing to ICSID arbitration, that the Convention
obligated the United States to enforce an ICSID award rendered
against Liberia. 9
Answering Liberia's objections, the district court assumed the FSIA
was applicable, although it offered no explanation for this as-
sumption. 60 The court then reasoned that when Liberia entered into
the concession agreement, which provided for resolution of disputes
by ICSID, Liberia invoked Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 61
Since Article 54 requires Contracting States to enforce ICSID awards,
the court concluded, "Liberia clearly contemplated the involvement
of the courts of any of the Contracting States, including the United
States as a signatory to the Convention, in enforcing the pecuniary
obligations of the award." 62 Following the rationale of the MINE v.
16 MINE v. Guinea, 693 F.2d at 1104.
17 650 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
58 Id. at 75.
19 See id. at 76.
60 Id. The court simply stated, "[T]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is ...
applicable here." Id. at 76.
61 Id. For the text of Article 54(1) see note 4 supra.
62 LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. at 76.
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Guinea decision, the court held that Liberia had waived its sovereign
immunity before United States courts with respect to the enforcement
of any ICSID arbitral award which arose out of disputes over the
concession agreement. 63 The waiver exception to sovereign immunity
in the FSIA, therefore, gave United States courts jurisdiction to
enforce the award against Liberia.64
While the result of the LETCO decision fulfills United States
obligations under the ICSID Convention, the reasoning employed by
the court conflicts with the language of the Convention and may
undermine the Convention's effectiveness. The ICSID Convention
provides its own particular jurisdictional rules for enforcement and
execution of ICSID arbitral awards. Specifically, the Convention
requires each Contracting State to recognize and enforce any ICSID
award as if it were a final judgment of the national or state courts
of the Contracting State, and only defers to domestic law of sovereign
immunity on the subject of execution of the awards. 65
The enabling legislation passed by the United States Congress cre-
ates confusion because it mandates enforcement of ICSID awards,
but fails to expressly exclude the defense of sovereign immunity from
enforcement. 66 Given the federal courts' practice of closely following
the language of a treaty's enabling legislation when interpreting the
rights and duties of parties to a treaty, 67 the inconclusive treatment
of the sovereign immunity issue provides little guidance for the courts,
as the LETCO decision illustrates. The court, although clearly aware
of the enforcement rules of the Convention and the mandatory en-
63 Id.
64 Id. The court quoted the waiver language in the FSIA and then stated that
"Liberia, as a signatory to the Convention, waived its sovereign immunity in the
United States with respect to the enforcement of any arbitration award entered
pursuant to the Convention." Id.
65 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
- 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650, 1650a (1982). In fact, in his testimony before the House
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Andreas Lowenfeld
stated, after quoting article 55 of the Convention, that "[a]s to whether [a court]
has jurisdiction over a party, there is nothing in the convention that will change
the defense of sovereign immunity." Hearings, supra note 11, at 18. This statement
is correct in the context of Article 55, which speaks only of execution, but is not
accurate in the context of Article 54. See supra note 27.
61 Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980). "[lIt is the implementing
legislation, not the agreement, that is given effect as law in the United States."
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) §
131 comment h (1986).
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forcement language in the enabling legislation, 68 automatically in-
cluded the FSIA in its analysis. In relying on the FSIA to determine
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce ICSID arbitral
awards against Contracting States to the Convention, the LETCO
court opened the door for Contracting States to shirk their obligation
to enforce ICSID awards in the future.
Precedent does, however, support the court's reliance on the FSIA.
Language in the FSIA's legislative history and in the Supreme Court
case of Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria indicates that the
FSIA provides the exclusive method of obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign states in United States courts. 69 In addition, federal courts
previously relied on the FSIA in enforcing arbitral awards issued
against signatories to the New York Convention ° and in denying
jurisdiction to compel AAA arbitration when the parties had agreed
to ICSID arbitration. 71 Nevertheless, a closer look at the legislative
history and the language of the FSIA itself reveals that Congress did
not intend for the FSIA to preempt jurisdictional law contained in
any international agreements in force at the time Congress enacted
the FSIA. 72 ICSID was in force before the FSIA; therefore, the
jurisdictional rules in the Convention and the United States enabling
legislation are controlling on the issue of sovereign immunity from
enforcement of ICSID awards. 7
3
The law of an international treaty and its enabling legislation are
proper sources for jurisdictional rules. Provisions of treaties to which
The court quoted the language of Article 54(1) of the Convention and made
reference to 22 U.S.C. 1650a in its discussion of the case. LETCO v. Liberia, 650
F. Supp. at 76.
69 "This bill ... sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving
questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State
courts in the United States." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 10, at 6610.
"The [FSIA] must be applied by the district courts in every action against a
foreign sovereign, since subject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on
the existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity."
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
70 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 41.
71 Unless two conflicting statutes can be reconciled, the most recently enacted
statute is controlling. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 135 (1986). The
FSIA and section 1650a can be reconciled, however, because the FSIA states that
it does not change any international agreements in force at of the time the FSIA's
enactment. See supra note 41.
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the United States is a party become "the supreme law of the land." ' 74
Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that in exercising its
authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations" Congress has
the power to decide, "whether and under what circumstances foreign
nations should be amenable to suit in the United States." 7 6 In adopting
the ICSID Convention and the accompanying enabling legislation
Congress appropriately exercised this power.
Because the FSIA conflicts with the Convention by granting sov-
ereign immunity and then carving out specific exceptions, the FSIA
should not be applied when a Contracting State pleads immunity
from enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards. The enabling legislation
gives effect to article 54(1) of the Convention, which implicitly denies
sovereign immunity from enforcement. Federal courts need only look
to the Convention and the enabling legislation to determine that
immunity from enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards is not available
to Contracting States. The courts should consult the FSIA only to
resolve the issue of which assets of a Contracting State are available
for execution of the award. This bifurcated process is consistent with
the distinction the ICSID Convention draws between enforcement
and execution. Moreover, the FSIA lends itself to this two-step anal-
ysis, as it also separates the issues of enforcement and execution. 77
The LETCO decision represents another unfortunate failure by the
courts to give the issue of jurisdiction to enforce ICSID awards its
proper legal setting.78 Including the FSIA in determinations of sov-
ereign immunity from enforcement of ICSID awards is superfluous
and counterproductive. Article 54 of the Convention eliminates any
defense to enforcement, thereby giving greater force to ICSID awards
than that possessed by other international arbitral awards. 79 The
resulting strength of ICSID awards creates a more secure and at-
14 See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 421 (1920); Foster
v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.).
" Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "[tJo regulate
commerce with foreign nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
76 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
11 Section 1605 of the FSIA prescribes rules for preliminary questions of juris-
diction, while sections 1609-1611 regulate the issue of execution. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605,
1609-1611 (1982).
11 See Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983),
in which the former Senior Legal Advisor to ICSID criticizes the court's reliance
on the FSIA in the Mine v. Guinea decision.
79 See Delaume, supra note 78, at 784; Coll, supra note 29, at 403.
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tractive environment for private investment in third-world develop-
ment.
The LETCO case represents only the second time an ICSID award
creditor has resorted to judicial enforcement proceedings. 80 While the
manner in which one Contracting State carries out its obligations
under the treaty does not bind the other Contracting States, it can
be influential.8 Because ICSID's denial of sovereign immunity from
enforcement is not explicitly stated, subsequent practice of Contract-
ing States in interpreting the treaty potentially becomes very influ-
ential. The LETCO rationale ignores the Convention and applies
domestic sovereign immunity law to the issue of enforcement. This
practice, if followed by other Contracting States with stricter sovereign
immunity laws, will undermine the strength of the Convention's
enforcement machinery by allowing Contracting States to hide behind
sovereign immunity and thus avoid their treaty obligations.
CONCLUSION
The security of investment agreements with ICSID arbitration clauses
is threatened each time Contracting States' courts rely on provisions
of domestic law when another Contracting State raises the issue of
sovereign immunity. The ICSID Convention makes it clear that Con-
tracting States are not entitled to sovereign immunity at the enforce-
ment stage. Federal courts must recognize and follow the federal law
contained in international agreements such as the Convention so as
not to operate contrary to the congressional foreign policy objectives
which motivated their ratification. The courts' failure to carefully
interpret treaty provisions may result not only in the United States
inadvertently breaching its international obligations, but may also
so In Benvenuti & Bonfant S.A.R.L. v. Gouvernement de la republique du Congo
(Cour d'Appel Paris, June 6, 1981), 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981) (in English translation),
108 J. Droit Int'l 843 (1981) (in original French), the French court of appeal gave
effect to the distinction which the ICSID Convention draws between enforcement
and execution. The court held that recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards
is possible when the creditor furnishes a copy of the certified award to the court,
and the courts therefore may not condition recognition on the creditor's ability to
locate assets in France which are available for execution under the French law of
sovereign immunity from execution. Id.
1, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides as a general rule that'subsequent
practice in the application of a treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation should be taken into consideration when interpreting a
treaty. Vienna Convention, art. 31., para. 3(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
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constitute judicial sabotage of multilateral efforts to solve interna-
tional problems.
Dorothy Black Franzoni

